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Abstract 
 
Ideas that the quality of parental nurturing and attachment in the first years of a child’s life is formative, 
hard-wiring their brains for success or failure, are reflected in policy reports from across the political 
spectrum and in targeted services delivering early intervention.  In this article we draw on our research 
into ‘Brain science and early intervention’, using reviews of key policy literature and interviews with 
influential advocates of early intervention and with early years practitioners, to critically assess the 
ramifications and implications of these claims.  Rather than the ‘hopeful ethos’ proffered by advocates of 
the progressive nature of brain science and early intervention, we show that brain claims are justifying 
gendered, raced and social inequalities, positioning poor mothers as architects of their children’s 
deprivation. 
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Introduction 
 
Ideas that biological mechanisms underlie personal and societal dysfunctions, and that the quality of 
parental nurturing and attachment in the first years of a child’s life are formative, are reflected in reports 
calling for early intervention from across the political spectrum in the UK.  Intervene in this window of 
opportunity early in a child’s life is the message, when synapses are connecting, before it is too late and 
their brains are hard-wired for anti-social behaviour and failure through poor parenting.  Public money is 
invested in intervention programmes that link the quality of parenting with the architecture of children’s 
brains. 
 
The argument is that these interventions are a positive step towards social mobility for poor children, 
breaking cycles of deprived brains and deprived circumstances in families, and indeed generally 
neuroscience has been associated with a transcendent ‘hopeful ethos’ that challenges neo-liberal 
rationality.  In this article, we critically assess the ramifications and implications of such claims, drawing 
on our research on the topic.  We review the key features of policy reports championing early 
intervention programmes, with their assertions of the foundational nature of early experiences.  We look 
at how such assertions chime with progressive accounts of how neuroscience offers a view of biology as 
opportunity rather than destiny, where people can optimise their brains for the betterment of society, as 
well as warnings about over-claiming and misrepresenting brain claims. We draw on interviews with key 
proponents of early intervention policies and practitioners working in the early years field to interrogate 
the way that, rather than a progressive initiative, early intervention using brain science claims 
essentialises mother-child relations, biologises ideas about cycles of deprivation and reproduces classed 
value judgments about the means of achieving the ‘right sort’ of brain development. 
 
Our Research: Brain Science and Early Intervention 
 
Throughout this article, we draw on material from the ‘Brain Science and Early Intervention research 
projecti.  This study looks at how biologised accounts of the formative impact of early experiences on 
brain development have come to shape politics, key social policy legislation and early intervention 
initiatives, as well as the consequences for everyday practices among health care providers and early 
years educators: www.brainscience.soton.ac.uk. 
 
Towards this aim, our research process included:  
 
(i) a review of key documents, including policy reports and talks by key advocates in the field that 
have been influential in shaping and defining political and policy engagement with brain science 
ideas, especially in relation to early years childrearing and intervention;  
 
(ii) (ii) semi-structured interviews with four influential public figures who have advocated the 
application of neuro-scientific concepts in intervention policy and practice: Camila 
Batmanghelidjh, CEO of Kids Company; Frank Field MP (Lab), author of early intervention 
reports and Chair of the Foundation Years Action Group; Andrea Leadsom MP (Con), author of 
relevant reports and Chair of Parent-Infant Partnerships; and Matthew Taylor, CEO of the Royal 
Society of Arts and former policy advisor to the New Labour Governments.  The interviews took 
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place in their offices and focused on the development of their interest in the topic; the sources of 
their information; their understanding of key and relevant brain science processes; their 
understanding of the relevance of parenting practices, and the consequences for intervention; 
and their perceptions of the benefits, limitations and risks of brain science ideas; and  
 
(iii) (iii) semi-structured interviews with 17 early years practitioners in the south east of England: 
eight working in the Family Nurse Partnership early intervention programme, seven working in 
Children’s Centres, and two health visitors.  Practitioners were accessed through the 
supervisors of the services in which they worked.  The interviews were carried out in the 
practitioners’ workplaces and, like the influential proponents, they were asked about the sources 
of their information; their understanding of key and relevant brain science processes; their 
understanding of the relevance of parenting practices and the consequences for intervention; 
and their perceptions of the benefits, limitations and risks of brain science ideas informing 
intervention. 
 
All participants were provided with information sheets about the project and signed consent forms. The 
public figures understood that their comments were ‘on the record’.  The early years practitioners 
understood that they would not be identified personally in our written outputs.  Given the sensitivities of 
our analysis, we subsequently negotiated with practitioners that we would not identify the particular 
localities in which they worked.  In recognition of practitioners’ concerns, in some cases we agreed with 
them that would only use direct quotes from their interviews that they had already seen. 
 
The literature and transcripts of talks and our audio-recorded interviews were subject to an in-depth 
discourse analysis, broadly involving close reading of the written text to identify recurring terms, 
metaphors and references that create and constitute understanding of an issue or set of issues (Gee 
2012).  We undertook a ‘team-checking’ process, where each of us separately read through an interview 
to identify these thematic understandings, and then brought our analyses together to identify and discuss 
overlaps and differences.  From this we generated a series of recurrent sets of discursive issues across 
the whole data set. 
 
Policies and Programmes 
 
The explicit linking of brain science claims and early years policy and practice came to attention in the 
late 1990s in the USA (Bruer 1999; Thornton 2011a).  In the UK, it appeared in a joint ‘think tank’ report 
from Graham Allen (Labour MP) and Iain Duncan Smith (Conservative MP) in 2008: Early Intervention: 
Good Parents. Great Kids. Better Citizens.  This report heralded several of the recurring features of 
subsequent policy documents arguing for early intervention: its proponents are from across the political 
spectrum, it asserts the formative importance of attentive parenting (mothering) for babies’ brain 
development and the narrow window available for preventive intervention, it relies on an eclectic mix of 
sources, and it reproduces an image of a normal and a deprived child’s brains taken from Perry (2002).  
For example: 
 
Scientific discoveries suggest it is nurture rather than nature that plays the leading role in 
creating the human personality.  Physiologically as well as emotionally, infants need a 
stimulating, accepting environment in which they feel safe and loved.  It has been said that ‘the 
greatest gift for a baby is maternal responsiveness’.  The more positive stimuli a baby is given, 
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the more brain cells and synapses it will be able to develop. (Allen and Duncan Smith 2008, p. 
57) 
 
Figure from Perry (2002): 
 
 
The joint report was followed by two from Graham Allen, both independent reviews commissioned by the 
government: Early Intervention: the Next Steps (2011a) and Early Intervention: Smart Investment, 
Massive Savings (2011b).  The ubiquitous brain images adorned the cover of each report.  The first 
Allen Report set up the case for early intervention because of the damage done to a baby’s brain 
architecture by sub-optimal parenting.  Reference was made to how the ‘wrong type of parenting and 
other adverse experiences can have a profound effect on how children are emotionally wired’ (2011a, p. 
xiii).  The second report emphasised extensive savings to public spending on social problems such as 
teenage pregnancy, low attainment, substance abuse and violent crime through investment in early 
intervention programmes.   
 
In addition to exhibiting the recurrent features instituted by the 2008 Early Intervention report, the Allen 
Reports display the tendency within such policy-focused output towards a cumulative referencing of 
previous reports as evidence for the arguments being made.  Cross-referencing assertions about the 
imperative to intervene early to ensure that babies’ and children’s brains are not damaged by poor 
parenting and thus prevent poverty and disadvantage are also found in the Field Report’s independent 
review of child poverty and life chances (conducted by the Labour MP Frank Field for the Coalition 
government) (2010); the CentreForum think tank report on social mobility (2011); the Munro Review of 
the child protection system (2011); the Tickell review of the Early Years Foundation Stage curriculum; 
the Department for Education and Family Justice Council commissioned report (Brown and Ward 2012) 
which puts forward neuroscience-informed ‘developmental timeframes’ with the aim of guiding court 
decision making in care proceedings; and the cross-party ‘manifesto’ 1001 Critical Days stressing the 
importance of the period from conception to age two for children’s life chances (Leadsom et al. 2013).  
 
The turn towards brain science as an evidence base for early years policy, and the attendant faith in 
increased returns for a plethora of social concerns, has been used to justify a turn away from universal 
support services for parents and families towards funding of national and local early interventions 
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services and programmes targeted at disadvantaged communities and families within the postulated 
crucial ante- and post-natal window of ‘1001 days’.  Examples include the Solihull Approach training 
system for early years practitioners (http://www.solihullapproachparenting.com/), the Family Nurse 
Partnerships delivering interventions with teenage first-time mothers based on the David Olds Nurse 
Family Program from the USA (http://fnp.nhs.uk/ and http://www.nursefamilypartnership.org/), and 
Parent-Infant Partnerships offering psychotherapeutic attachment intervention (http://www.pipuk.org.uk/).  
There is also funding for guidance and advice as to the need for and efficacy of early years intervention 
programmes, including the ‘A Better Start’ information resources guiding Big Lottery funding for early 
intervention projects (http://www.biglotteryfund.org.uk/betterstart), and the ‘What Works in Early 
Intervention’ Centre, assessing, guiding and advocating intervention initiatives (http://www.eif.org.uk/). 
 
In the rest of this article we explore these policy and practice developments further, with a particular eye 
to whether or not their brain science claims carry hope for addressing social inequalities. 
 
The Rise of the Early Years ‘Neuromolecular Gaze’ 
 
Ideas about brain science and early intervention resonate with what Joelle Abi-Rached and Nikolas 
Rose (2010) have referred to as ‘the molar management of human affairs’ (p. 32).  Underpinning this 
molar management is what they term the ‘neuromolecular gaze’ – by which they mean a hybrid style of 
thought, approach, language and perception that reduces understanding of complex phenomena to a 
molecular understanding gathered around the brain, and which means that intervention in the brain can 
shape behaviour.  They argue that people are increasingly defined, and attempts made to manage them, 
in terms of the brain: 
 
We are seeing a concerted attempt, across Europe and North America at least, to argue that the 
discoveries of these neurosciences hold the key to the management of all manner of human 
activities and experiences. (op cit, p. 32) 
 
In their subsequent book, Neuro, Rose and Abi-Rached (2013) build on the notion of neuroscience as a 
transcending hybrid to put forward what they refer to as a transcendent ‘hopeful ethos’ associated with 
new styles of thought in neuroscientific knowledge.  Their argument is that that the concept of brain 
plasticity that is a key feature of contemporary neuroscience has the potential to refute biological 
reductionism and determinism by revealing ongoing mutability through the interaction of biology as brain 
and environment, and also provides a challenge to mind/brain dualisms.  The hopeful ethos of plasticity 
means that we/society will be able to shape our brains – which are evolved for sociality – through 
shaping environmental input in good ways, for the betterment of society.  This sociality, Rose and Abi-
Rached assert, also provides a challenge to the dominant rational neo-liberal ideas of the individual that 
have driven policy in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries   
 
An issue that is left aside in this scenario, however, is the unequal, gendered, raced and classed, 
environment within which ideas about the brain are engaging; a set of issues that we will consider further 
in this article.  The other side of the coin of the hopeful ethos of taking personal responsibility for our 
selves for the collective good is the more vindictive ethos of blaming the victims.  When Rose and Abi-
Rached state that ‘… we are now acquiring the obligation to take care of our brain – and the brains of 
our families and children – for the good of each and of all’ (2013, p. 223) what we assume to be their 
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collective ‘we’ is very easily understood as an individualised ‘you’ where a neo-liberal logic holds sway.  
The hopeful ethos with respect to ‘our’ ability to take responsibility for and govern the future rather than 
be at the mercy of what happens feels a bit naïve to us in that respect.  Indeed, Rose and Abi-Rached 
themselves discuss how neuroscience has latched very easily onto the psychological ideas that are 
entrenched in how we understand childrearing.  Despite their espousal of a hopeful ethos, they refer to 
the brain as the current mode of objectivity about the development of children. As such it represents  the 
latest incarnation of a longstanding preoccupation dating back to the nineteenth century, which has seen  
social ills addressed at the level of the child through intervening in and governing inadequate parents 
and families – a recurring of a strategy that Rose and Abi-Rached note has not had much success (p. 
197). 
 
This raises the question of how a version of brain science has gained such influence in the early years.  
A range of reasons have been identified.  In his book The Myth of the First Three Years, John Bruer 
(1999) discusses a number of means by which neuroscience has been and is used, or misused, by early 
years advocates in the USA as part of a public relations drive to ensure funding for programmes to help 
disadvantaged children.  In an austere political context where pre-school intervention programmes were 
regularly criticised for not being effective enough, brain science was mobilised to explain the relatively 
modest outcomes from large public expenditure. It was argued that such initiatives missed a crucial 
window of development because they commenced once the child had reached three years old. Instead it 
was claimed that much earlier intervention was required to capitalise on the rapid synaptic proliferation 
characterising infanthood. As Bruer notes, the assertion of a brain hardwiring cut off point by three-
years-old that infuses much policy and practice literature is more determined by the age-range of a 
service delivery in the USA than it is by neuroscientific fact. 
 
Rose and Abi-Rached argue that a range of conceptual, technological, economic and bio-political 
‘mutations’ have enabled neuroscience to ‘leave the laboratory and gain traction in the world outside’ 
(2013, p.9).  In addition to the latching of neuro discourses into already embedded psychological ideas, 
these reasons include the equipment that enables the scanning of brain functions.  In themselves, 
images of the brain such as the one used extensively in early years materials, illustrated in the Figure 
above, lend credibility to deterministic statements about brain development just by their very presence.  
These images seem to have a strong hold on the imagination as a concrete representation of the mind 
and indeed personhood, becoming a cultural icon (Thornton 2011a).  Children and people generally are 
posed as comprised by their brains and parents as rearing the brains.  For example, in the interview for 
our study Frank Field MP described the contrasting child brain scans image as ‘a brain that’s loved and 
nurtured and one that isn’t’. 
 
Such crude brain science ideas take correlations as causal, with activity in a brain region seen as 
causing psychological and social processes.  The fact that two things are identified as happening 
together does not automatically mean that one causes the other.  That blood flows in one part of a brain 
are shown as ‘lit up’ on an fMRI scan does not mean that the rest of it is inactive; indeed the images are 
not straightforward representations of activity at all.  Nor is it straightforward to determine what activity in 
a region of the brain ‘means’ or ‘causes’.  In particular, narrow ideas about rigid critical or sensitive 
windows of development are over-emphasised, where lack of a certain type of parental stimulation early 
on in a child’s first years are posed as causing permanent stunting of socio-emotional development. This 
is graphically represented by the shrunken brain element of the image.   
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Increasingly such over-claiming and misrepresentation of neuroscience has come under challenge, 
including by neuroscientists, in books, articles and other media (see discussions in Bruer 1999; Rose 
and Abi-Rached 2013; Schmitz and Höppner 2014; Wastell and White 2013; and blogs such as The 
Neurocritic, Neuroskeptic and Neurobonkers), pointing out the caveats and lapses in bad assertions and 
adoptions of neuroscience and in the neuromolecular gaze generally.  For example, in an op-ed piece in 
The New Yorker on ‘neuroscience fiction’, Gary Marcus (2012), a neuro-psychologist at New York 
University, commented:  
 
Our early-twenty-first century world truly is filled with brain porn, with sloppy reductionist thinking 
and an unseemly lust for neuroscientific explanations.  But the right solution is not to abandon 
neuroscience altogether, it’s to better understand what neuroscience can and cannot tell us, and 
why. 
 
More specifically, assertions such as windows of opportunity in which children’s brains are hard wired by 
the time they are three or earlier, with how their mother in particular interacts with them being the causal 
feature in whether and how they develop emotionally and socially, have been challenged.  On her 
DeevyBee blogspot, Oxford Professor of Neurodevelopmental Psychology, Dorothy Bishop, has focused 
on the erroneous implications of neuromania for parenting and intervention (2011); and tellingly, even 
the ‘leading neuroscientist’ Bruce Perryii whose brain image and work is much cited in the independent 
policy reports, has criticised the assertion that there is a link between the size and development of 
children’s brains, poor parenting and crime (http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2010/apr/09/iain-
duncan-smith-childrens-brains).  It is clear, though, that advocates of the use of brain science in early 
years intervention find neuroscientific discourse useful. 
 
The Relationship Between Neuroscientific Discourse and Policy 
 
Bruer’s (1999) account of the embracing of early years and brain development as a public relations 
exercise to gain funding alerts us to the issue that rather than brain science driving early years policy, it 
is a useful rhetorical trope to push or further embed a particular policy direction (and to avoid others: 
Edwards et al. 2016).  Both policymakers and early years providers acknowledge, respectively, that 
neuroscience discourse has a role in promoting early intervention policy and in justifying public 
expenditure on it: 
 
If you’re asking to what extent does neuroscience and just neuroscience influence policy I would 
say in a very very limited way … there can be a tendency to want to put the neuroscience 
argument at the front because it’s couched in science and, you know we generally speaking 
believe science has an authority that social sciences doesn’t have. (Matthew Taylor) 
 
The reality is our service is expensive.  We have to be clear that what we’re doing works and 
there’s a reason for what we’re doing so we have to justify it hugely so it’s [got to be] absolutely 
clear that this early period makes a huge impact to people’s whole lives, prison populations, all 
those sort of things in the future. (Family Nurse Partnership 3: supervisor) 
 
Neuroscience it seems has not necessarily been called upon for its actual explanatory capacity, but for 
its persuasive value.  Several studies have shown that, however irrelevant or plain misleading, ‘brain 
science’ information and images lead people to accept assertions (McCabe and Castel 2007; Weisberg 
et al. 2008).  This persuasive power is increasingly being harnessed in the context of constraints on 
public spending and economic insecurity.  Neuroscientific discourse and fMRI scan images are being 
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mobilised to show that psychoanalysis works and deserves funding for example, where the 
neuromolecular gaze equates the physical brain with the psyche.  The Anna Freud Centre in London 
uses neuroimaging techniques to demonstrate the beneficial effects of therapeutic intervention, such as 
Parent-Infant Psychotherapy (http://www.annafreud.org/pages/the-parent-infant-project.html).  The Kids 
Company charity runs a ‘Peace of Mind’ campaign to raise funds (http://www.kidspeaceofmind.org/).  
People can go onto their website, access a virtual brain, donate to purchase a virtual neuron, invite their 
social networks to do the same, and then the neurons will cluster together in the virtual brain.  Camila 
Batmanghelidjh, their Chief Executive Officer, was clear that neuroscience is good for fundraising in the 
business sector when we interviewed her. 
 
It is hard to be against what seems to be a hopeful ethos and progressive early intervention.  As we now 
go on to show, however, bad neuroscience and the mis-interpretative rhetorical value of brain science at 
the policy level has implications for practice, and these are not progressive. 
 
Attaching Biologised Mothers 
 
Early intervention policies and services are often couched in the gender neutral terminology of 
‘parenting’.  Yet early intervention largely is directed at mothers as the core mediators of their children’s 
development.  Initiatives usually are delivered through pre- and post-natal care provision in poor 
communities (e.g. the ‘A Better Start’ programme provides Area Wellbeing Profiles of developmental 
outcomes for 0-8 year olds so that intervention programmes can be targeted: 
http://betterstart.dartington.org.uk/resources/data/awp/).  Pregnant women and new mothers are 
targeted.  The core significance of mother-child relationships in the early years is underlined through 
reference to the developing brain and the child’s need for an available and responsive primary 
caregiver.iii  The quality of care is claimed to be reflected in the anatomical structure of the child’s neural 
circuits with sensitive mothers producing ‘more richly networked brains’, as asserted in this quote from 
Why Love Matters, a book by Sue Gerhardt that many of the early years practitioners we interviewed 
were directed to read as part of their training: 
 
The baby's brain is doing a lot of growing in the first year - it more than doubles in weight. The 
enormously increased glucose metabolism of the first two years of life, triggered by the baby's 
biochemical responses to his mother … Lots of positive experiences early on produce brains 
with more neuronal connections - more richly networked brains. We have all our neurons at 
birth, and we don't need to grow any more, but what we do need is to connect them up and 
make them work for us. With more connections, there is better performance and more ability to 
use particular areas of the brain. (Gerhardt 2004, p. 42-3)  
 
This notion of the more connections the better is a selective representation, telling half a story.  There is 
no link between synaptic proliferation in infanthood and future performance.  Pruning of neurons and 
synapses also needs to take place in the early years for effective functioning (Inglasias et al. 2005).  
Moreover, such a biological emphasis embeds and justifies the gendered focus on mothers as naturally 
better attuned to their infant’s needs. The foundations for secure attachment and optimal brain 
development are traced back to pregnancy, with the prenatal period identified as physiologically and 
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psychologically crucial – both in terms of neural growth of the foetus and the establishment of a healthy 
attachment bond between mother and child.  The rationale for this reflects a reformulation of old and 
contentious tenets of mother-child attachment theory.  Davi Johnson Thornton (2011a & b) argues that 
ideas about attachment theory have shifted over the past half century as they have keyed into ideas 
about increasing babies’ brain capacity.  The original attachment framework prioritised mother-baby 
bonding as a biologically driven outcome of situations where mothers and babies are together during the 
early months.  In recent years, however, the focus has developed into a stress on mothers needing 
deliberately to invest time and positive emotional connection in their children as an intense self-managed 
project – the success of which can be captured in baby brain scan images (McVarish 2014; Wall 2010).  
It is this particular combination of attachment theory and neuroscience that underpins claims that 40 per 
cent of British babies are not attached securely to their ‘parents’ asserted by the Sutton Trust (2014) and 
repeated by one of the MPs we interviewed – an assertion that has been challenged as full of 
misunderstandings and misinterpretations of the attachment tests and evidence (Horsley 2014; Meins 
2014). 
 
This neuroscientised theme is also played out through a focus on the mother’s as well as the child’s 
brain, reflecting an essentialist turn towards viewing sensitive motherhood as biologically determined.  
Commentators claim that mothers’ brains are re-programed during pregnancy, with this article in 
Scientific American being just one example: 
 
The bodily changes of childbearing are obvious, but as we are discovering, the changes in the 
brain are no less dramatic … The maternal brain is a formidable object, a singular entity forged 
by hormones, neurochemicals, and exposure to the ravening demands and irresistible cuteness 
of offspring.  During pregnancy, the female brain is effectively revving up for the difficult tasks 
that await … Among its remarkable changes are those that allow the mother to focus on her 
infant in the persistent attempt to puzzle out the child’s needs and wants. (19 January 2010: 
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/pregnant-brain-as-racecar/) 
 
The interviews with early years practitioners for our study show that there is also a practice emphasis on 
the significance of the mother’s brain as potentially producing too much of the stress hormone cortisol in 
pregnancy: 
 
Basically the babies are growing within the womb and actually the chemicals that we put around 
the baby can influence their brain development.  And I tend to talk to the young people about it 
...  And actually they kind of grasp that and then they try and avoid the stress and the trauma for 
their child. (Family Nurse Partnership 5); 
 
After birth mothers also needed to protect their baby from biological risk through inattention and/or 
rearing them in a difficult environment.  One practitioner (Family Nurse Practitioner 1) explained how 
family, housing and other problems could cause mothers stress and thus affect babies’ optimal brain 
development, while another noted: 
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[There’s the] worry about leaving the babies to cry because of all this stuff about cortisol 
damaging the brain, so that does also influence.  You want to give out safe evidence-based 
practice. (Health Visitor 1) 
 
This concern about cortisol levels positions mothers as in control of their stress reactions, and was 
expressed through appeals to consider what getting stressed might do to their baby ante and post 
natally.  Practitioners seem to be encouraged to conceptualise stress primarily in terms of relationships 
rather than pressures associated with disadvantage or lack of resources.  Consequently, the advice from 
practitioners was to avoid arguments, implicitly advocating a submissive position where young women 
may be at risk of domestic violence (Wiggins et al. 2005). 
 
The link made between attachment theory and brain science has accompanied an explicit gender 
encoding of early intervention policy.  While the default language of ‘parenting’ continues to frame key 
literature, detailed accounts now frequently give way to female pronouns and references to mothers.  For 
example, amongst many references, the first Allen Report (2011a) discusses ‘the emotions in the 
exchanges between mother and baby’ (p. 13), ‘the mother’s mental state’ (p. 15), ‘maternal 
responsiveness’ (p. 16) and ‘the bonding of an infant to their mother’ (p. 73).  The primacy of mother-
child relationships is a core principle structuring the everyday work of many early years intervention 
programmes.  Early years practitioners we interviewed who worked with disadvantaged teenage mothers 
did so with the key aim of strengthening attachment bonds and increasing maternal sensitivity.  At the 
heart of this intervention is the implicit assumption that poverty and disadvantage are personal failings 
associated with poor parenting.  Indeed teenage pregnancy itself could be viewed as evidence of a 
damaging upbringing: 
 
Everyone has a history, a pattern of something that’s happened before. It’s not a surprise that 
these young girls get pregnant. What would be interesting to see is the baby’s outcomes and 
whether when they’re older they make very different choices. (Family Nurse Partnership 6) 
 
The early years practitioners we interviewed were enthusiastic about neuroscience and its application to 
practice, feeling that it provided strong proof of attachment theory to policy makers, funders and mothers 
themselves.  The Family Nurse Partnership programme require practitioners to raise the subject of brain 
development in the first visit to the pregnant mother as a way of underlining the crucial significance of 
participation in the programme and the associated imparted advice.  Mothers are provided with a 
photocopied sheet titled ‘How to build your baby’s brain’ featuring a list of activities claimed to enrich 
neural connectivity. These include reading books to their babies, singing nursery rhymes, and playing on 
the floor with them.  Practitioners can draw on a variety of creative methods to convey this information.  
For example, one explained that she gave mothers a dot-to-dot puzzle and called out random numbers 
to demonstrate the importance of correct brain wiring (Family Nurse Partnership 6), while another spoke 
of dropping Alker-Seltzer tablets into a glass of water to illustrate how activities fired up new synapses in 
infant brains (Family Nurse Partnership 2). 
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Practitioners often viewed their role as helping to break cycles of deprivation by providing a better start 
for the new baby: 
 
This programme gives [young parents] well researched advice and an opportunity to discuss a 
different way of parenting this new baby.  So just break cycles of behaviour and patterns of 
behaviour that have grown up within families through generations … The more we know, the 
more we understand, the more appropriate support can be given to perhaps try and break what 
previous generations have, how they’ve acted.  To help the biological processes play out in the 
way they’re meant to when you’re doing everything you should have done.  (Family Nurse 
Partnership 4); 
 
Hopefully, if the parent has taken [what you are teaching them] on board, the child will have a 
chance of succeeding and having that lots and lots of repetition to connect that brain cognitively 
to what they are doing … Not everyone is going to have an MRI scan, but I think it would 
highlight particularly parenting skills and it would reinforce what I was saying that actually if the 
parents haven’t got those skills then the children are never going to gain those skills. (Children’s 
Centre 4) 
 
Despite expressed commitments to work with mothers and their family members, practitioners could 
portray the parents of their clients as a malign influence, undermining their work and modelling how not 
to care for babies.  One practitioner referred to the way that she had to work around overpowering family 
members who thought things should be done in certain ways (Family Nurse Partnership 2), while 
another was more explicit: 
 
The young mums know what they want, we’re just helping them say you can do that. Sadly 
many a grandparent will say ‘you can’t, why do you think you can do that then’, ‘she don’t need 
that then’. (Family Nurse Partnership 6) 
 
The cultural deficit model underpinning early years intervention and the focus on embracing change 
ensures disadvantaged families are automatically conceptualised in terms of risk, with little consideration 
given to wider structural and economic factors. This normative promotion of intensive mothering also 
engrains Eurocentric assumptions, delegitimising alternative values and ways of life.   Practitioners saw 
neuroscience knowledge as justifying more robust interventions, undermining any objections made on 
the grounds of cultural relativity. Several reflected on how their sensitivities to difference in the past had 
prevented them from intervening in a way they now know is right.  Referring to the brain scan image in 
the Figure above, a Children’s Centre supervisor reflected on how he might have been swayed by lay 
norms previously but now he and the Centre practitioners were far firmer: 
 
But I think just brain science, that photograph shows to me so much, and it gives me so much 
passion in what I’m doing … I think it really gives me that umph to stick by it, rather than just 
give in to what society might think is okay.  So we’ll stand by it and give more definite ‘this is the 
right thing to be doing’. (Children’s Centre 2)  
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Brain science training was also posed as revealing the crucial nature of issues that practitioners might 
have previously overlooked, to underpin intervention: 
 
Often [the mothers] will say things like, ‘Oh [my baby] doesn’t like me’, or I hear all these little 
things, and I think probably maybe in the past without the knowledge and the training you might 
not have really recognised the significance of that, and so now I guess it’s then asking questions 
antenatally about ‘how do you feel about your baby?’. (Health Visitor 2) 
 
The historical and cultural specificity of parenting can be acknowledged but is made irrelevant in the 
context of a scientific evidencing of fragility and damage.  Yet the version of attachment theory 
underpinning intervention models relies on a white, Western conception of ideal family life.  In many 
communities across the world childrearing is shared among wide social networks.  Kinship care and 
interdependent households are the norm and exclusive parental care is rare (Otto and Keller 2014).  
Applying a scientised logic of early intervention positions some cultures at greater risk of genetic 
impairment and brain damage simply because of their childrearing practices.  The implications of this 
reasoning range from a sanctioning of culturally insensitive professional practice to a potential 
resurgence of biologised racism, part of a wider ‘molecular reinscription of race’ fed by a complex loop 
between phenotype and social practices related to that phenotype (Duster 2006, p. 427; see also 
Mansfield and Guthman on epigenetics and new configurations of race and reproduction). 
 
Overcoming Social Class 
 
Embedded in brain science ideas is social class, or rather the overcoming of social class in various 
ways.  The Conservative-led Coalition Prime Minister, David Cameron, has described the realisation of 
the importance of parenting above socio-economic status as ‘one of the most important findings in a 
generation’ (Cameron 2010).  In interviews conducted for our study, an MP and a policy advisor each 
talked about the way that brain science overcomes outmoded ideas about social class as shaping life 
chances:  
 
[Brain science] breaks the class spell. ‘Oh well, we could have done, you know but it’s the 
wretched class system in our country, it’s so tightly drawn, you know, there’s not much we can 
do about it’.  And the early years studies seem to show that’s not true. (Frank Field MP); 
 
When sociologists point out that poor kids have worse life chances than rich kids, is there a 
danger that people on the Left adopt a kind of crude social determinism … this kind of crude 
sociological determinism excused, you know, really an abdication of responsibility for the school 
to do whatever it could to actually change the destiny of those young people whatever their 
backgrounds. (Matthew Taylor) 
 
In their, and the views of others of all political colours, brain science overcomes outmoded ideas about 
social class as shaping life chances.  Brain science breaks the class spell and avoids social 
determinism.  Instead a form of biological determinism enables policy makers to endorse and pursue 
some sorts of policy intervention and to avoid others.  They no longer have to bother with ideas about or 
 13 
strategies for redistribution.  They can put that aside and focus down on the real, ‘molar management of 
human affairs’ issue – how parents bring up their children. 
 
Practitioners operate within this climate, where social mobility and poverty are individualised and brain 
science discourses are utilised in targeted and commissioned early intervention systems that must prove 
their worth, to portray mothers’ attitudes and behaviour as determining their children’s later outcomes.  
For practitioners, maintaining their professional commitment to making a difference in difficult situations 
can then mean that they are positioned to see early intervention as able to overcome social class.  One 
of the practitioners we interviewed constructed a ‘Billy Elliot’ style storyiv with a sub-text of damaging 
working class culture, aspirations and masculinity, holding back the development of working class infants 
whose brains would be stimulated if exposed to high culture: 
 
The two young people I saw yesterday.  He’d never told anyone but he’d wanted to be a ballet 
dancer.  He didn’t dare tell anyone because he would be laughed at, so he took up 
skateboarding.  Which was a sort of halfway house sort of thing.  They both love classical music 
but they’d never dare tell anyone because they’d be laughed at.  But actually when they told me 
I was so excited for them and I said ‘you know this is going to help your baby’ … He’s damaged 
his knees too much though to be a ballet dancer with his skateboarding so that’s a shame.  But 
he’s artistic, he’s learning to be a tattooist.  So he’s got art, you know, you can see it in him.  But 
his father didn’t want to hear about it, any dancing, wanted football, rugby, that was fine, but any 
of that other stuff, no don’t mention it again.  Because he probably did mention it when he was 
10, 11, quite bravely.  But if his children were allowed to say it in the future aged 10, that would 
be great wouldn’t it? (Family Nurse Partnership 4) 
 
The classical music that the teenage parents secretly love is going to help their baby, presumably in 
ways that surrounding the child with more commercial, popular music will not.  The skateboarding has 
damaged the young father so that the more desirable and aspirational ballet dancing is now out of the 
question and, presumably unfortunately, his artistic streak can now only be channeled into tattooing.  
This ‘Billy Elliot’ type story hints at the way that, viewed through the neuromolecular gaze of brain 
science, ideas about what counts as suitable development and as demonstrating the right sort of brain, 
are not straightforward but in fact reproduce gendered and classed value judgments.  
 
The story also raises another means by which neuromolecular brain science ideas have gained 
influence.  They resonate with neo-liberal ideas about control over individual destiny in a precarious 
social world, and what middle class parents can do to counter the ever-present fear of their children 
slipping into downward social mobility.  As both Bruer (1999) and Thornton (2011b) note, as soon as 
early years intervention advocates in the USA promoted the first three years of life as critical for brain 
development, middle class parents became consumers of brain-based products and activities that would 
help their children to achieve educationally (which then left them even more anxious).  By virtue of being 
middle class, parents are posed as having acted to achieve and sustain their children’s middle classness 
(just as their own parents did for them).  It then follows that what is middle class childrearing practice is 
good childrearing practice.  Parental behaviour that is going to ensure the brain architecture that 
promotes or retains social mobility for middle class children must surely result in social mobility for 
working class children.  This is the logic behind assertions in the introduction to the CentreForum liberal 
think tank report, Parenting Matters: Early Years and Social Mobility (2011, p. 5): 
 
The paper will outline the key scientific concepts behind the development of early brain 
architecture and skill formation and identify the crucial challenge these present to the desire to 
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improve social mobility. It will argue that these concepts create the imperative for greater efforts 
at intervention directed at the family sphere to prevent the squandering of individual potential 
(particularly among children from lower-income backgrounds). 
 
In the early years field, then, rather than a hopeful ethos, the appeal and language of neuroscience is 
being deployed to produce a deterministic orthodoxy that explains and justifies class inequalities.  
Indeed, policy and practice is basically arguing that the poor are underdeveloped, that there is 
something missing in their brains, that they do not experience normal emotions, and most powerfully that 
they do not love their children like ‘we’ do.  As Graham Allen MP – then Chair of the Early Intervention 
Foundation – announced to a conference on early intervention attended by practitioners: 
 
… for me early intervention is about giving every baby, child and young person social and 
emotional capability, you’ve all got that, you take it for granted, you got it from your parents, you 
hand it on to your kids, you don’t even think about it … we come across those people, you come 
across those people … a lot of people to whom standard parenting skills are unusual.  To whom 
nurture, love and giving a baby interactivity and capability are not things that they did learn 
themselves. (Westminster Social Policy Forum, 2013, p. 16) 
 
Conclusion 
 
The association of brain development with social mobility resonates with the claim that the 
‘neuromolecular gaze’ transcends the determinism characterising previous biological models of 
personhood. From this perspective fate is not determined at birth, but is shaped by early social 
processes that mould the brain.  We take issue with Rose and Abi-Rached’s reading of the current 
‘neurofication’ of culture as an open and broadly optimistic trend, however, particularly the contention 
that the plasticity principle of neuroscience largely consigns reductionism and determinism to the past.v 
 
Rose and Abi-Rached describe how the brain is now regarded as ‘optimisable’, with biology viewed as 
opportunity rather than destiny.  Definitions of optimum, however, are replete with value judgements as 
the requisition of neuroscience to authenticate and legitimise a re-traditionalisation of motherhood 
demonstrates so effectively. Biological discourses around pregnancy and breastfeeding offer an account 
of the optimal female brain that confirms the primacy of the traditional family, leaving little scope for 
notions of gender plasticity.  In relation to early intervention the focus on brain development is being 
used to support a simplistic account of socio-economic advantage and disadvantage.  Even those early 
years practitioners who were not delivering targetted intervention programmes and thus not specifically 
trained in brain science ideas, were aware of them and made easy links between attachment, cycles of 
deprivation, brain development and children’s outcomes. 
 
The current policy preoccupation with the nurturing practices of poor families relies on a meritocratic 
construction of the wealthy and privileged as having better developed brains. Success is naturalised and 
unproblematically correlated with brain structure and intelligence. From this perspective the solution to 
poverty is to make people smarter – children of the poor can then think themselves out of their 
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predicament. Recognition of systematic, structurally engrained inequality merely holds back the power of 
the individual brain, creating a psychological block that circumscribes achievement and justifies inertia. 
This is certainly an optimistic standpoint, but it is of a type that Lauren Berlant (2011) has referred to as 
a ‘cruel optimism’.  She argues that the social-democratic promises of political and social equality and 
upward mobility are unachievable fantasies within liberal-capitalist societies that can no longer provide 
such opportunities.  The hopeful discourse of brain science in early years policy is both devoid of any 
basis in real experience of hardship, and reinforcing the social inequalities it promises to overcome. 
 
The period identified for critical infant brain development has been increasingly scaled back from an 
initial starting point of three years. The ‘prime window’ for development currently is estimated at ‘1001 
days’ from early pregnancy, beyond which deficits are portrayed as hard to overcome.  In early years 
policy and practice plasticity is presented as a brief, fleeting opportunity for deliverance before the 
window of opportunity slams shut. While in the USA brain development was originally commandeered to 
revalidate early years support services, the use of brain science claims in the UK more often is 
characterised by causal determinism.  Early intervention as a practice is now targeted towards a small 
minority of deprived families, while the contentions and distorted science framing the doctrine are drawn 
on more broadly to lend credence to the responsibilisation of poor mothers, positioning them as the 
architects of their children’s poverty and deprivation.  
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Endnotes: 
                                                     
i  The research was funded by The Faraday Institute under its ‘Uses and Abuses of Biology’ programme.  The project 
received ethical approval from The Faculty of Social and Human Sciences Ethics Committee, University of Southampton. 
ii  Whether or not Dr. Bruce Perry is a ‘leading neuroscientist’ is subject to question.  See Wastell and White (2013). 
iii  There is a silence in the early intervention field about affluent parents whose children may be cared for by unqualified live-in 
help or sent away to boarding school, and thus may also be judged to be ‘insecurely attached’.  The neuromolecular gaze of 
the early intervention story of consequent stunted brain development would also apply to them.  Nonetheless, such an 
assertion would be as misleading in its determinism as it is in the case of the parenting of poor, working class mothers.   
iv  A film and then a musical telling the story of a young boy growing up in a mining village during the 1984-5 strike who 
aspires to be a ballet dancer.  Billy’s father initially forbids this fearing his son will be considered a ‘poof’ (gay) but eventually 
comes around and is supportive, overcoming the dominant narrow version of working class masculinity constructed in the 
narrative. 
v  Manfield and Guthman (2014) make a similar argument about how epigenetic models of plastic life may appear to have the 
potential to eliminate race but rather has ushered in a new form of racialisation based on reproductive processes. 
